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Community/ Difference: 
The Tragic Community 
of Beings 
Adelino Zanini 
1. Modern/Postm odern 
Il problema Jilosofico della modernita era rappresentato dalla condizione 
del soggetto come essere capace di diventare plurale; problema lasciato insolu-
to dalla modernita e il soggetto divenuto plurale ma, per sua condizione, riti-
ratosi in universi singolari, assolutamente omogenei nella loro forma, quanta 
irripetibili nella loro serialita. Una stessa condizione, riprodotta in serie, ma 
non piit vissuta come mezzo per proporre il plurale come valore capace di 
superare quella serie. Io vedo in cio quanta di piit irresolubile esista nell'oriz-
zonte del pensiero critico. La condizione moderna ha di fatto esaurito un ciclo 
espansivo del pensiero: ogni vocazione filosofica che ambiva ad una liber-
azione dell'umano dal limite si e dovuta misurare con una duplice crisi: da un 
lato, con l'ingovernabilita dell'oggetto che aveva contribuito a creare, dall'al-
tro, con l'insubordinazione dei soggetti che, spesso, ne avevano anticipato lo 
sviluppo. La condizione moderna, dunque, quanta piit ha espresso un'alta 
socializzazione e razionalizzazione, tanto piit ha generato "luoghi" del dif-
ferire, .. . caduchi non per condizione, ma per relazione-non rispetto alla 
potenza, ma al potere. In cio, d'altra parte, in questo residuare e moltiplicare 
di potenze, il compiersi del ciclo si e tramutato in un rimando continua. Il 
moderno e costante residuare dell'essere, il differire esprime potenza e residua 
storia. Effettivamente, tra Nietzsche e Heidegger il compimento sembrava 
definitivamente inverato, giacche aveva condotto fuori da ogni dialettica. In 
realta, cio che Ju ribadito-oltre ogni umanesimo fenomenologico ed esisten-
zialistico-fu proprio l'essere come rimando: una comunita dell' essere tragi-
co. (Zanini 1991) 
Modern/Postmodern: it is certainly not a dialectical dyad, nor a 
time sequence. It is an unsolved problematic point-perhaps with no 
solution - almost an abyss, from which the philosophical intelligence 
of the last ten years has not managed to emerge1. The Modern is unre-
solved, because it is unresolvable. The Postmodern is not the fulfill-
ment of any tradition, because Western metaphysics cannot be fulfilled 
until collective forms of subjectivity-lacerated and plural as much as 
you like- deposit an absent reminder of being. For these reasons, I am 
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convinced that it is useless to try to define a time scansion, ages of 
thought defined in time by a Modernity eventually achieved and by a 
Postmodernity displayed before us in any case-if you like, as a sim-
ple strong "ideology." The presence of a possible, fatal, certainly indef-
inite, hypothetical "transit" is looming up. 
All this in order to put forward two aspects: I doubt it is possible 
to assume the diversity between Modern and Postmodern as an irrev-
ocable time transaction; I doubt it is necessary to label postmodern 
ideology as progressive or not. We are faced with a given theoretical 
reality: again bringing up the question of the essential paradigms of 
Modernity-rationality and subject, in primis-articulated in sociologi-
cal, scientific and philosophical reflections. This reality is strong. It is, 
of course, a reality which is implicit in the modernity of authors such 
as Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Heidegger, Wittgenstein; it is a reality 
which was not "created" but assumed by the Postmodern, without 
having to "expect" any fatal achievement. This is the point: it does not 
go without saying that Modernity may be achieved, it does not go 
without saying that Postmodernity can legitimize itself only after this 
eventual achievement. Il moderno persiste nel residuare un problema di 
fondo: una communita dell'essere tragico; il postmoderno-quando none chi-
acchiera-amplifica questo problema come condizione. 
2. Habermas versus Weber 
Habermas, it must be said, has forcefully addressed this set of 
problems 2• I doubt that Habermasian solutions really solve the prob-
lems, but they do repropose, in no uncertain terms, the real questions 
in their doctrinal complexity. However, I do not wish to discuss the 
very complicated articulations of Habermasian solutions, but rather 
their ethical-linguistic implications, in relation to one of their polemi-
cal referents. Attention has already been given to the eventual compar-
ison between Habermas and Lyotard's reflection 3 (Rorty 1984). From 
my point of view, I will just consider it from one particular aspect, 
inherent to the rationality/ subject relationship; a relationship which is 
dominated by a linguistic "excess". For convenience, I'll follow the 
Habermasian course starting from the cruciality of the theme of ratio-
nalization in the Weberian sociology of religions. 
It is well known, thanks to a series of valuable works, that the 
subject of rationalization has found in Weber its genesis in the compar-
ative studies of the so-called world religions. The subject of Western 
rationalization, in particular, has been efficaciously understood from 
the subjects of the sociology of religions. Essentially, from a Weberian 
point of view, a religious disposition induces man to calculate the con-
sequences of his actions on the basis of expectations; inevitably, this 
attitude promotes a calculating rationality, which makes man rational-
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ize his existence with respect to what surpasses and confounds human 
sense. Of course, modern science can meet the earthly needs to face 
uncertainty and human pain; however, the questions which remain 
continue as an unacceptable limit. The search for a superior instance 
motivates the need to find an extreme ratio, which better explains the 
sense, even extreme, of the human condition. 
Briefly, this is the space where the excess of the sacred is placed; 
on the other hand, this excess, humanizing in the extreme the presence 
of God in the World, can only reduce God in the World. Effectively, if 
God is expressed in and for the World, questioning the sense of the lat-
ter we can find the ultimate answers: the sense of this extreme ratio is 
resolved in the disenchantment and secularization of the divine image. 
By means of the paradox of theodicy, man discovers the sacred in 
mundane habits, he experiences, at the same time, freedom in excess: 
the relativization of all values, disenchantment and politeism. The line 
of escape of the Weberian sociology of religions can only indicate in 
Politics, therefore, the instance in which the Modern is accomplished: 
it is rationalization. 
Such an outcome, until a few years ago ascribed only to Weber's 
political and economical works, therefore, has been completely 
"re-written" by Habermas in his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 
He confirms, of course, that the subject of rationalization has found in 
Weber its essential point in theodicy-to which it follows, moreover, 
not only the proclaimed politeism of values, but the most radical the-
sis of the loss of meaning of the World-but he comments: "In him 
[M.W.], that experience of nihilism-typical of his generation-which 
Nietzsche had strikingly emphasized, is reflected: reason splits into a 
plurality of spheres of value and destroys its universality (Habermas 
1986, I, 349-350). It is clear that a strategic insufficiency in the Weberian 
theory of action is immediately apparent to Habermas, since in the 
very dispersion of distinct rationality, of spheres of value which break 
up the universality of reason, he indicates an inadequate schematism. 
Briefly, Weber would venture "too far when from the loss of the sub-
stantial unity of reason he infers a politeism of the strength of faith in 
conflict, whose irreconcilability is rooted in a pluralism of the incom-
patible instances of validity," because "on a formal level of argumenta-
tive satisfaction of pretenses of validity, the unity of rationality in the 
multiplicity of the spheres of value rationalized according to its own 
autonomy is guaranteed" (Habermas 1986, I, 352). 
Substantially, the rejection of the Weberian "steel cage" is aimed 
against the insufficiency of a theory of action which, in the Weberian 
process of rationalization, is accomplished in rationality with respect 
to the aim, lacking the extension on an institutional level of that broad 
concept of rationality which Weber placed "as the basis of his investi-
gations into cultural traditions" (Habermas 1986, I, 358). 
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Disenchantment, actually, if intended as a space of the exclusive domi-
nation of calculating action, simplifies the different meanings of the 
rationality of a social action. 
Putting aside the considerations that the Habermasian "re-writ-
ing" stimulates, let us try to gather the essence of this complex argu-
mentation. Evidently, the critical point is Weber's reduction of the 
rationality of action to mere instrumental intention. Obviously, 
Habermas does not intend to misunderstand the importance of instru-
mental rationality; but he insists on those distinctions which should 
save, so to say, what has "universal" value in rationality. The theory of 
communicative action is this: the expression of rationality, constituted 
by reasons of last instance, belonging to "agents with language and 
action," subject to, and "accessible to an objective evaluation" 
(Habermas 1986, I, 79). 
Very synthetically, the agents, whose actions meet, cannot be 
intended as mere executors of processes of rationalization foreign to 
them; their meeting each other comes about on the horizon of a 
Lebenswelt made up of "the basic convictions, more or less widely held, 
ever a-problematic." This is why, of course, meeting each other and 
understanding each other must define the space within which "the 
agents communicatively set the situational contexts which are prob-
lematic each time, in need of agreement" (Habermas 1986, I, 138). The 
theory of communicative action is not represented, therefore, as a pro-
cedure with forgone harmonic results, at all. It is much more realistic 
to imagine a "groping" procedure, in which one goes "from one occa-
sional convergence to another" (Habermas 1986, I, 177). So, the con-
cept of Verstiindigung, as a "process of convergence between subjects 
capable of language and action" (Habermas 1986, I, 395), is absolutely 
problematic, distinct from a "mere factual convergence" and, there-
fore, an unimposed expression "of a rationally motivated assent." But 
in any case, what is relevant is this distinguishing, in rationality, 
between what is instrumental action from what is available for under-
standing between the agents capable of language and action, who 
establish interpersonal relationships, try to understand each other, just 
in order to coordinate their mutual action. Therefore, "the problematic 
of rationality" is an essential reference mark, since communicative 
actions always need "a rational interpretations in formulations" 
(Habermas 1986, I, 183). 
The aim of the theory of communicative action is therefore to 
permit "a conceptualization of the social nexus of the life, which is cut 
out on paradoxes of modernity" (Habermas 1986, I, 46 ). The 
Habermasian project must be referred to in order to understand the 
Modern as is expressly indicated in the ample and less monumental 
subsequent reflections to Theorie: Die philosophische Diskurs der 
Moderne. 
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Habermas, actually, is an irreducible critic of the presumed tran-
sition between Modern and Postmodern: Modern is "unachieved pro-
ject." This is true, in so far as the meditations which should have made 
postmodern argumentation sensible-meaning by the latter the stren-
uous and radical criticism of rationality-rather than render the over-
coming of the background on which the Modern is measuring itself 
possible-the philosophy of the subject, in the first place-have sys-
tematically re-prosed it as an umesolved theme (Habermas 1987, 57). 
This is true for Hegel, whose Absolute "uses the philosophy of 
the subject in order to overcome the reason centered in the subject," 
defining itself, however, as "the infinite process of self-connection, 
which absorbs within itself all the finite" (Habermas 1987, 35-37); this 
is true for Marx, whose philosophy of praxis "remains a variation of 
the philosophy of subject, which does not place reason in the medita-
tion of the knowing subject, but in the finalistic rationality of the sub-
ject agent" (Habermas 1987, 67). Far more complex, it is true, is the 
process starting from the Nietzschean meditation; nevertheless, it 
becomes crucial for this reason: there where the tension about the 
Human is extreme, in fact, one reaches that "particular theodicy, 
according to which the world may be justified only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon" (Habermas 1987, 98). It follows, according to 
Habermas, that the Nietzschean "unmasking rational criticism of rea-
son" is caught up "in the dilemma of a criticism of reason which refers 
to itself and has become total." Substantially, "Nietzsche must affirm, ( 
... ), the possibility of a criticism of metaphysics, which exhumes the 
roots of metaphysical thought" (Habermas 1987, 100); therefore, the 
thought of the origins in no case overflows from Modernity: neither 
with Nietzsche, nor with the most radical interpreters of the end of 
Western metaphysics. It does not overflow with Heidegger (Habermas 
1987, 141), in whose philosophy "an authentically human privilege 
which requires explanation" remains; nor with Derrida, who "inherits 
the weaknesses of a criticism of metaphysics which cannot free itself 
from the intention of the philosophy of the original" (Habermas 1987, 
184); nor, mutatis mutandis, it overflows with Foucault, whose concept 
of Power, besides being "borrowed from the same subjective philoso-
phy" (Habermas 1987, 278), remains moreover caught up in an inde-
finable antagonism "of the disqualified knowledge of the 'people' " 
(Habermas 1987, 284). 
If the instance of the reconciliation of the subject seems to be 
essential for Hegel and Marx, an aesthetic and ecstatic dimension 
seems essential for Nietzsche and Heidegger, for Derrida and 
Foucault. Metaphysics as Word, the subject as a Body cannot be 
renounced. For this reason, Modernity is at least unfinished, and 
Habermas repeats his point of view. The Modern is unfinished because 
the disownment of a strong subject by a weak subject does not go out-
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side a philosophy of the subject. As the different assumptions of a 
weak subject are based on the contraposition between instrumental 
reason and the crisis of reason, they lose, with the sense of discursive 
rationality, the possibility of changing the approach, of renouncing the 
immense task of crowning metaphysics. 
Only to such a renunciation would follow in fact the possibility 
to instigate "the subversive force of the same modern thought against 
the paradigm of the philosophy of the conscience applied from 
Descartes to Kant" (Habermas 1987, 312). And there would follow also 
the retrieval of rationality as a disposition of agents and talking sub-
jects, able to acquire a fallible knowledge. Substantially, the leading of 
communicative action as far as "conceiving the rational praxis as 
embodied in history, in society, in bodies and in languages." 
(Habermas 1987, 318). In the social relationships-where instrumental 
action is entwined with communicative action-the Lebenswelt, as the 
original belonging to every agent, would substitute the "conscience" 
of the subject: "With the concepts, which integrate each other, of com-
municative action and of the world of life, there is introduced a differ-
ence between determinations which-differently from the difference 
between labour and nature--does not dissolve again as moments in a 
superior unity." "The procedures for the discursive formation of will 
established, in a structurally differentiated way, in the world of life are 
destined to ensure social links of everyone with everyone, through the 
equal considerations of the interests of each individual" (Habermas 
1987, 341-45). 
We accept this hypothesis provisionally-even though it is no 
less important that the accomplishment of the Modern "exclaimed" by 
Heidegger or by Foucault does not allude purposely to any postmod-
ern typology. We accept, hypothetically, that the Habermasian con-
frontation with the philosophy of praxis is resolutive. A singular situa-
tion results. Habermas, by "linguistically" confirming the existence of 
a social, dialogical link, arrives at proposal which are at least partially 
similar (Habermas 1987, 363) to those which Lyotard reaches after 
denying the resistance of the same social link. Evidently, something is 
wrong. Perhaps, the maintenance of rationality is not sufficient to dif-
ferentiate Habermasian language from Lyotardian language; perhaps, 
the "linguistic" act works, both in the accomplishment of Habermas-
ian' s Modern and in Lyotard's invoked dissolution of it, as an exe-
mplifying and simplifying referent. This hypothesis is, all things con-
sidered, not far-fetched, and is sufficiently easy to structure itself 
through a concise comparison. 
3. Lyotard versus Habermas 
In comparison with Habermas, Lyotard's criticism starts from an 
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essential assumption: the search for the linguistic univocity in ordi-
nary language is certainly "une tache noble," however, it remains a 
platonic instance: it remains dialogue. Or rather, such a search must 
bear a weight which in the end is excessive: the weight of an indemon-
strable universality and rationality of communication. The dialogical 
instance is in essence platonic in the end, because it does not grasp in 
the "epilogues de la modernite" -Kant and Wittgenstein-the drying 
up of a unirational and universalistic approach (Lyotard 1983, 11). To 
be explicit, Lyotard's criticism of Habermas contained in La condition 
postmodern points out that the Habermasian instance of the Diskurs 
gets caught up in "the search for a universal consent," obtainable in a 
dialogical way; in this way, says Lyotard, the heteronomy of the rules 
and the search for dissent disappear. In the Habermasian Diskurs, in 
fact, the modern instance of-emancipation, as a "universal" discourse, 
remains integral. 
Lyotard's criticism of Habermas are certainly pertinent. One 
could in any case ask if Lyotard' s criticism on the one hand, and the 
Habermasian universalism, on the other, are really irreducible if they 
are translated in terms of "practical reason." It is true, in Lyotard, the 
differend is the instance which removes the dialogical consent as telos; 
nevertheless, I do not feel that in the latest Habermas, the consent, fea-
sible in a dialogical form, interprets its universality as completeness. 
Of course, rational instance has an insuppressible space for 
Habermas-not like Lyotard's-and it confides in the dialogically fea-
sible agreement. It does not presuppose a universal consent, it is a 
local consent, even if it is, of course, on a dialogical basis. 
On the other hand-when we reach the "practical reason" of the 
linguistic act, what we are interested in-not even Lyotard can 
renounce mutual understanding, a transitory consent (probably, one 
could discuss about the means which make this consent possible; it 
may express itself through silences, but it is still a relationship, other-
wise the con-senso (consensus) is a contradiction in terms). If this is true, 
the following comparison may be indicative. 
Habermas: 
For both the [interpreting] sides, the interpretative task consists of 
including the other's interpretation of the situation in one's own inter-
pretation [ ... ]. However, this does not mean that the interpretation 
must produce in any case, or normally, a stable, differentiated correla-
tion unequivocably. The stability and unequivocability rather represent 
the exception in normal everyday communicative praxis. More realistic 
is the image of a diffused, fragmentary communication, which under-
goes a constant revision, which is only momentarily sucessful, in which 
the participants base themselves on unclear and problematic presuppo-
sitions, groping their way from one chance convergence to another. 
(1986, I, 177). 
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Lyotard: 
The recognition of the heteromorphia of the linguistic games is a first 
step ... ). It implies ( . . . ) the relinquishment of terror, which supposes 
and attempts to realize its isomorphia. The second step is the principle 
on the basis of which, if consent exists about the rules which define each 
game and about the "norms" which are put into practice in it, this con-
sent ought to be local, obtained by the interlocutors moment by moment 
and subject to possible revision. (1981, 120) 
Dialogue/ dissension: it would be wrong to reduce the differ-
ences excessively-not by accident Habermas proposes as the critical 
object that Postmodern which Lyotard would just ascertain. However, 
it may be noted that the focalization of ethical intelligence on linguistic 
acts greatly reduces the margins of differing, where one reaches a 
"practical reason" departing from strong common starting points-in 
this case, Wittgenstein . This, in fact, may transform itself into a real 
linguistic excess, if it is deprived of that mystic enchantment which 
Wittgenstein explicitly leads to. Substantially, the problems are at least 
twofold: the first contemplates the respective coherences of these lin-
guistic excesses; the latter should measure the degree of credibility, in 
terms of "practical reason", which these excesses may exhibit since 
they are both expressions of what surpasses any residual of subjective 
philosophy. 
Now, the excess does not create any flaw in the internal coher-
ence of the Lyotardian postmodern theory: not just because every phi-
losophy of history is naturally absent, but because every intention 
towards projectable results in history is absent as well: Politics, after 
all, is just one of the tragic beings, aesthetically lived as "rules," with 
no necessary links with rationality. Linguistic excess, in this case, does 
not show anything, it just shows itself in the transparency realized by 
the Modern and accomplished by the Postmodern. 
Similar observations, for obvious reasons, are not applicable to 
Habermas. Not so much because there is a historicistic residual in his 
theory, but because the intention towards history (which is not philos-
ophy of history) is there and it is shown in the conviction that rational-
ity has an unequivocable place and that transparency, disenchantment, 
though dialectically irredeemable, are beings given but modifiable by 
rationally motivated reasons of agreement. Of course, no matter what 
Habermas says, communicative action does not turn into the seman-
tics of language: anyway it is hard to understand how it can mediate 
an undoubted privilege of linguistic action, where language is a later 
ratification of otherwise explicit behavior; or rather, as the 
undoubtable privilege of linguistic action is not necessarily the privi-
lege of "saying," even where the source of con-sentire and dis-sentire are 
rationally unpronounceable. It is in these terms, besides, that Lyotard's 
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criticism of Habermas explains itself, because linguistic excess in both 
authors assumes strategies which are differently connected with ratio-
nality. 
What returns to reproduce similitudes between our two authors 
is the demolition of any residual subjective philosophy as a common 
strategy just to linguistic excess-demolition in which simplifying 
moments are certainly not missing. The most important of these is 
surely the one according to which the subject is only what the Word 
represents (or can no longer represent) as it is conscience. In short, it is 
the Cartesian subject which Husserl criticized, in this form meditated 
and remeditated by the Heideggerian and hermeneutical tradition, 
easily "compromised" by Luhmannian functionalism, or, it is a vulgar 
Marxian Prometheus, of which, thank God, we cannot remember. Such 
a subject, always singular, not by accident (Nancy 1990), has fatally 
crashed on a discursive track-from Descartes to Foucault-which is 
really suspicious. Perhaps, it is not by chance that Habermas simplifies 
Foucault considerably, especially the latest Foucault and, in general, it 
is not by chance that strategy of difference is understood by Habermas 
just as a simple polysemy. 
It may be observed that even this similitude is, after all, irrele-
vant, if one admits that Lyotardian linguistic excess does not allude to 
a space in which social action is redefined. Actually, things are not 
quite like this. The Lyotard of La condition postmoderne, at least, 
reaches a "practical reason," whose results are not significantly far 
from Habermasian results as already indicated above. And now for 
the second problem. 
In short, I am convinced that the definition of a linguistically 
based "practical reason" -both if it exasperates the Wittgensteinian 
disenchantment without taking on its mystical disclosure, and if it 
transcendentalistically re-interprets it as a rational universal-in any 
case, reaches an apparent solution to the theme of Modernity: the sub-
ject. Both the Lyotardian linguistic excess and the Habermasian excess 
talk about transcendental subjects, which do interpret a large part in 
the culture of modernity, but not in all of its essential articulations 
inherent to the subjects (the plural is deliberate). Apart from that, 
then-apart from the fact, that is, if this really is the crunch with the 
cultures of Marx and Weber-another aspect is no less curious: both 
Lyotard and Habermas, in the end, invoke, in support of the "practical 
reason", empirical subjects, about which they are unable to say any-
thing. The fact is, that proclaiming the end of a transcendental subject 
is not so important if it serves to recuperate, sociologically, spaces for 
generic empirical subjects-both if they are Habermasian dialogical 
agents and Lyotardian decision-makers. Either these subjects are 
empirically qualified, or it is useless to invoke even their marginal 
presence. The linguistic excess is not therefore resolutive-it remains 
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this side of Wittgenstein . 
In other words, if the passage from Modem to Postmodern is in 
these terms of difficult definition, it is also due to this: to the constant 
remaining of the theme of the "community of tragic beings," within a 
philosophical language which either does not have the courage to dis-
own the human Voice and, therefore, continues to redeem its sense 
within a dialogic "practical reason"; or, even though it does have the 
courage, it continues to play at returning with "practical reason" as a 
disagreement (where the human Voice is not removed, but the pretens-
es of its unirationality are annulled). In both case linguistic excess 
reaches reiterated extremes, but never the radical threshold of real 
silence, there where Wittgenstein is silent: "This rushing at the limits 
of language is ethics" (Wittgenstein, 1980, 21-22) 
4. The community of tragic beings 
What is the sense of the "community of tragic beings," involved in this 
silence? The osmotic proceeding of development and progress was 
characteristic of full Modernity; what we are now living as our condi-
tion is, still, the constant evolution of the roots of evolution, prescind-
ing from any normative idea of progress. We are that is "caught" in an 
ambiguous development-which does not mean "weak" or without 
explicit connections of interest, of course-the more energetic, the 
more void of normative referents, which are in fact untenable, because 
they are unable "to bear" a horizon of possible accomplishment. 
Modernity, the ideology of progress aimed at a dialectical accomplish-
ment, a kind of self-overcoming in development; its normative ideal 
was certainly "utopian," but compulsory and therefore regulative. 
Now, however, it is clear that there is no dialectical relationship 
between development and progress, since the former meets and 
ignores major limits-geographical, ethical, ecological-well before 
the latter can "accomplish itself," independently of this accomplish-
ment. Development no longer alludes to any "accomplishing-in-pro-
gress." 
This is manifestly true in economic terms, it is true in political 
terms. In fact, it has not only produced the enormous economic differ-
ences between the world hemispheres, but also our democratic politi-
cal systems, in which the maximum transparency-and therefore the 
maximum development reached-corresponds to the minimum 
involvement. However, it is only an apparent contradiction, since it is 
really a terminal manifestation of a unique ambiguity-in the literal 
sense of the word-maximum transparency and strategic withdrawal 
in the ipseitas, to which, "enlarged," an accomplished tragic instance 
corresponds: where the Modem remains an insuppressible residual 
and it resolves itself in a real aesthetic of the tragic. 
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This aesthetic of the tragic strengthens, at the same time, the ethi-
cal undecidibility of politics and its resolution in government. It 
resolves, that is, what appears contradictory and is really ambiguous, 
replacing it in a growing complexity. Actually, undecidibility and deci-
sionism are both-even though opposites-possible extensions of the 
epistemological figure of complexity. Complexity is "a negative 
notion: it expresses the fact that one does not know or one does not 
understand a system, in spite of a background of global knowledge 
which lets us know and denominate this system ( ... ) it implies that 
one has a global perception, and at the same time the perception not to 
control it in detail" (Atlan 1986, 96). The decisionistic approach, of 
course, makes an "instrumental" use of the indeterminate and resolves 
politics in technique; the opposite approach, viceversa, grasps in the 
indeterminate the infeasibility of one technique and of that technique. 
What remains common to both is anyway the "human" groundless-
ness of politics and the resolution of the tragic in minimal ethics. In 
any case, that is, the complexity is an autopoietic figure: it interprets 
possibility or impossibility of politics, always, as government-whet-
her it is efficacious or not. Politics is "humanly" unfoundable, substan-
tially, because it cannot be "other" with respect to government. Both 
are shown in complexity, in the breaking down of self-referential 
processes, in the hyperreality of a complete practical disenchantment. 
The human instance does not found politics, therefore, since no superi-
or Periclean rationality founds a privileged language of politics. What 
is residual of human is only spread: minimal ethics. Without any 
excessive forcing, politics, as a relationship of relationships, may be 
reflected in determinate epistemological forms-"politeistic," "gnos-
tic," "dual" (cf. Bateson 1972), deprived of subjects-forms which do 
not admit "one" rationality and, therefore, characterize politics as a 
contingent government of complexity . At any rate, the problem remains: 
is it impossible that what presents itself as a postmodern transcendental aes-
thethic of the tragic be transftgurable into an ethics of the tragic community 
of beings? 
Let us assume this "datum" in order to climb back up the slope 
of ethics, let us assume it, shifting however the contingent from the 
political sphere to the ethical sphere. Let us turn to Baudrillard (1987). 
The velocity of development characterizes social experience as a desert 
in the eighties: flat territory, where any reference is absent or transitory 
and therefore subject to constant shifting and cancellation. The causal 
nexii are therefore forgotten; time no longer has any depth, it does not 
permit plotting of indicative sedimentations, because time is spending 
in the immediate of the eternal equal: the line, the geometrical element 
whose curves, at the limit of possible experience, is only imaginary. 
Social experience has lost the place where it can be found, because it 
no longer has a memory. The "triumph of surface" creates an absent 
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space where traces are unthinkable more than unobtainable. The 
velocity of elapsing leaves no wake: it is pure velocity, total, which 
does not remember the starting point and therefore has no destination 
to reach. Amnesia makes the wayfarer inebriated, makes of it just a 
moved subject, moving on a surface with no indications inherent to 
the travelled and worn road, inherent to the road ahead. Pure velocity 
takes the same wayfarer towards a possible catastrophe, there, where 
even the inebriation of pure velocity, of the straight passing into the 
immediate, is no longer noticeable by any experience. Inebriation of 
development, in fact, leads to the desert, to the absent totality of social 
experience: to the desert, or the place of apparent lack of life, whose 
ecological balance actually keeps our infinite social history in its com-
plex geology, in its "baroque linearity", in its past splendor, in its 
remaining contingency. 
The long metaphor may embody, I think, some essential assump-
tions: the inebriation of development leads to a desert, to absent totali-
ty of the represented human experience. Politics is a constitutive part 
of this desert, it governs its "baroque linearity" in the form of repeated 
and complex contingencies. Its abstraction is equal to the transparency 
generated by development. Ethics, vice versa, has no relationship with 
any contingency, because it is the set of contingencies, as opaque as the 
idea of pro-gresso in complexity, of a striding forward. Therefore, ethics 
is a residual, an indicative sediment, since the relationship between 
development and progress is not resolvable, nor subject to accomplish-
ment: it is a paradox, a modern puzzle which is destined to last as long 
as the collective character of its remaining lasts. Politics consumes 
time, theologically it leads to the end of times, or better, it is at the 
beginning and end of time. It is theophany which has been accom-
plished: powers legitimate powers, contingency creates complexity. 
However, ethics recuperate marginal time, what is left: in the uncer-
tainty of duration it alludes to a destiny-shrouded in ruins-which is 
not to be accomplished. 
The angel of history must have this aspect. He faces the past. Where we 
are faced with a series of events, he sees a single catastrophe, which 
unceasingly accumulates more and more ruins and it spills them at his 
feet. He wishes to restrain himself, awake the dead and put the broken 
together again. But a storm is blowing up from paradise, which has got 
caught up in his wings, and is so strong as to prevent the angel from 
closing his wings. This storm irresistibly pushes the angel towards the 
future, to which he turns his back, while the mound of ruins rises to the 
sky in front of him. (Benjamin 1981, 80). 
What is ineludible is the tragic: but in the aesthetic image of poli-
tics the instantaneous time of that image is consumed; in the ethical 
image our destiny remains in a deep time. 
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Utopia? Not really: no ideal place returns as a lost language. 
Contingency, however : "for no other cause a thing is called contingent, 
except that it regards a defect in our knowledge" (Spinoza 1973, 
1,33,1). Contingent ethics is, in fact, what in its complexity does not 
permit: a discovery of its own "true" external determination, a sort of 
emanationism. What cannot be determined positively is its cause and, 
therefore, its immediate opacity, its depth in time, its residual of future 
memory. It is not redemption, it is not promised accomplishment: it is 
a simple and essential expression of imperfect being, of the collective 
body tragically outstretched. Politics resolves itself in an aesthetic of 
the tragic, since it fixes one of the possible instantaneous solutions of 
the contingent in the complexity, in the image of the accomplishment 
of times; ethics does not resolve itself in anything, it remains the tragic 
[tried] in duration, since the complex lives in it as contingent, and this 
contingent is thus constitutively unsolvable. 
Negri observed (1987, 54) that "through the discovery of contin-
gency, we put forward in radical terms the problem of foundation 
( ... )-this foundation is the starting point for the maximum widening 
of the dimension of possibility . A tragic possibility, an eventual[ity] 
that our reason and heart cannot sometimes bear-the destruction of 
being, such a generalized death as not to have repetition-in a word, 
the end of time ." Independently of whether or not we consider the 
problem of foundation, I believe it is essential to think of ethics as an 
unfolding of possibilities; or rather, in the terms which have been used 
so far, it seems essential to consider ethics not as a tragic image, an 
instant which resolves time, but as tragic duration, as far as possible 
linked to the safeguarding of a memory of the future: ethics can only 
be a memory of the future. The extreme speeding-up of human trying 
has cancelled time-duration, substituting it with time as a succession 
of instants. As we have said, politics, precisely for this temporal break-
ing-up, can govern the complex through the contingent; ethics, vicever-
sa, suffers this breaking up, as it is a complex contingent. In short, if an 
idea of composition may be given, it will not be an idea of "recomposi-
tion," of "redressing;" it may only be given as a "possibility of possi-
bilities," precisely, the beginning of sedimentation of a contingent in 
the complex contingency, of a new "remembering" of time starting 
from now: memory of the future. Ethics is the more tragic side of a 
thinking which is exposed to the death of time; the extreme possibility 
of not reaching the end of time, of not consuming the future in the 
instant: the Modern as an insoluble residual. 
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NOTES 
1. It would not be too farfetched to state that Italian philosophical cul-
ture has attained an international relevance, especially when, beginning in the 
early eighties, it tackled this thorny problem, the question of modernity. It is 
understood that there had been some profound views before that, but they 
were often considered as secondary against an originary European culture, or 
at any rate, too heavily bogged down by ideologies, whether Catholic or marx-
ist, which made them either too radical or too retrograde for the international 
community. The paradox of the '80s is that suddenly the national fortunes are 
inverted: Gentile resurfaces, while Gramsci disappears; Del Noce reemerges as 
Paci and Preti vanish in the background. Simultaneously, the doors of the 
philosophical communities are open wide to non-Italian thought (thanks also 
to unusual and questionable alliances). 
2. In Italy, the thought of Habermas has enjoyed a vast reception and dif-
fusion, first, in the strong French critique of Western capitalist 
rationality/ pragmatism, then that baluardo beyond the lagare of luhmanian 
technocratic functionalism, as it is thus originally interpreted in the ethic of the 
Diskurs. Especially on the Left, its reception has been by necessity diversified, 
whether in relation to the evolution of Habermasian thought, or in relation to 
the diverse schools of thought and to the changing nature of its 
occurrence/ application in political practice. 
3. The fortune/reputation of Lyotard in Italy is owed above all to his 
pamphlet La condition postmoderne and consequently, to more strictly philo-
sophical texts. On the other hand, the translation of this text in 1979 happened 
at a moment in in which more than ever, philosophy recognized the growing 
impact of information technology and the technologies of knowledge. One has 
only to look at the collected issues of "alfabeta" or "aut aut" of those years. 
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